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JUDICIAL UPDATES IWC Did Not Have Authority to Issue Order Exempting Employer from Providing Second Meal Break Based on Collective Bargaining Agreement The case of Bearden v. U.S. Borax, Inc., involved six mine workers (the “Employees”) who worked for U.S. Borax (the “Employer”) at its open pit mine operations. They sued the Employer for denial of meal periods mandated by Labor Code sections 226.7 and 512(a), and by Wage Order No. 16-2001, on the ground that they were required to work 12.5 consecutive hours for each of their shifts, but were given only one 30-minute meal break per shift. They sought statutory penalties, unpaid wages, injunctive relief, and legal fees and costs. The Employer demurred to the complaint, arguing that section 10(E) of the Wage Order made the Employees exempt from the second meal period requirement. That wage order section provides that subsections (A) and (B) (which state the basic rules requiring meal and rest periods) do not apply to any employee covered by a valid collective bargaining agreement if that agreement expressly provides for the wages, hours of work, and working conditions of the employees. In opposing the demurrer, the Employees argued that the Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC) exceeded its authority in adopting section 10(E). The superior court sustained the Employer’s demurrer and dismissed the claims. The Court of Appeal reversed that decision, concluding that the IWC (which is now defunct due to lack of funding by the Legislature) exceeded its authority in promulgating the wage order at issue. The appellate court noted that the IWC’s powers do not extend to the creation of additional exemptions from the meal period requirement beyond those provided by the Legislature. The authority of the IWC to adopt or amend working condition orders has existed for many years under Labor Code section 516. However, in 2000, that section was amended to read: “Except as provided in Section 512 . . . . .” Section 512, of course, expressly created two exemptions to the meal period requirement. Based on the language of these two statutes, and the rules governing statutory construction, the Court of Appeal held that the Legislature intended to restrict the adoption or amendment of exemptions to the meal period requirement.
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